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In discussing highways in Civil Defense, it might be well to first look at 
the whole picture of Civil Defense, including necessity, and, if there is necessity, 
just what should be done. 
During the past month it seems that the dissemination of information on 
Civil Defense has been stepped up through the newspapers, radio and television. 
Many of you no doubt have heard the broadcast sponsored by CBS and given by 
Arthur Godfrey in which a simulated atom bomb attack was made on certain 
cities of the United States. We were told then that only 30% of the planes carry-
ing bombs would be shot down. Also, some of you saw, on television , the blast 
at Yucca Flats. You have read, too, in the newspapers, of a plan to ring certain 
cities with air craft defense. There is no doubt that at this time emphasis is 
being placed nationally on the need for stepping up our civil defense program-
ming. Still the answer as to whether we expect atomic bombing is everybody's 
guess. Our opinions as to the necessity for civil defense measures are no doubt 
governed considerably by where we live. In the industrialized east and in large 
cities the answer to whether we need a strong civil defense is yes, and reports 
received seem to bear out that in some of these states planning is very far ad-
vanced and considerable. State as well as federal money has been spent. 
In December, 1951, the survey research center at tl1e University of Michigan 
made a study of public attitudes on civil defense. People were interviewed in 
the following cities-New York , Chi.cago, Phi.ladelphia, Los Angeles, Detroit, Bos-
ton, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, St. Lou.is, Cleveland and San Francisco. These inter-
views were conducted in Septemb er and October of 1950 and again in the same 
cities in August and September of 1951. 
Here are some general conclusions from the study which indicate the con tent 
and scope of the report: 
1. "People generally expect that America ,may well be in for another world 
war. i\liany look for war within a year or two. There is a preponderant 
belief tl1at such a war will be of the all-out kind, with atomic weapons 
being used against U. S. cities. Germ and gas warfare are not considered 
as much of a threat as atomic weapons, but this appraisal may result from 
lack of public knowledge about these weapons. 
2. People are coming to 'realize that civil defel)se is an increasingly urgent 
necessity. They understand its purpose and meaning. Even if we should 
have peace in Korea, they say we should build a strong civil defense. 
3. The recognition of this need for strong civil defense has resulted in general 
\villingness to work in civil defense. However, this willingness has not 
reached the point of conviction that people as individuals should join civil 
defense now. Nearly half the people in these 11 major cities have not 
heard or read that volunteers are needed. This may partly explain why 
only one out of three adults has thought seriously about volunteering. 
4. Considerable progress has been made in public understanding of tl1e 
nature of atomic warfare and especially in J...'11owledge of personal pro-
tection. The total amount of knowledge is still small but nearly 90% of 
people know a few simple things they should do to protect themselves. 
This is an increase of 25% in Jess tlrnn one year. 
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5. Almost without exception, people need much more information about the 
dangers of total war; about the importance of their personal participation 
in the civil defense of their community. 
6. Some of the people who need information most are not being reached by 
general media. Special ways must be found to increase their knowledge 
and enlist their support." 
More than 60% in both the 1950 and 51 survey thought that in case the 
United States was attacked our cities likely would be hit by atomic bombs. Ninety 
per cent thought that children should be taught in school what to do in case of 
an atomic bomb attack. 
The whole problem of civil defense then seems to hinge oo war, as no doubt 
a majority of the people believe that all out war would mean atomic attacks 
and it appears from the best information now that we have no defense that would 
stop atomic attacks 100%. Of course, we must not forget that civil defense would 
be of assistance in any disaster, such as floods, fires, earthquakes, etc. NATURAL 
BARRIERS like rivers, mountains, Maginot and Siegfreid lines, the English Chan-
nel and oceans are still helpful in ground defense, but small hindrance in the case 
of bombs or guided missiles. 
We can then assume that if there is war there will be atomic bombing and 
some of our cities will be rut: This, then, brings up the same old question-will 
there be war, when, and how much warning ~ill we have. Your answer is as good 
as any columnists, and may be as good as the ' experts. The army, of which we 
would really be a part, cannot give the answer. The army in an aggressor country 
is only a tool and 1nilitary conquest is for gaining certain political aims. An army 
in a democratic country such as ours is primarily a defensive organization and 
can plan only such steps as are necessary to stop the enemy. They cannot foresee 
all of the political maneuvering of other countries. 
Right now we do not know whether Stalin's death will cause a change for 
better or worse. We do not know whether peace talks will result in any solution. 
o one seems to know, so our thinking must be-prepare for the' worst but hope 
for the best. 
At any rate none of us are willing to rule out the possibility of war, and 
since war would mean all out mobilization, there should be, and there is, civil 
defense planning. Naturally, the tempo of planning and your interest is going 
to be governed by your location, the tenseness in the country and the leadership 
shown at National and State levels. 
Bernard Baruch, before a Congressional Committee, said : "An enemy con-
templating an attack against this country could have only one plan-to overwhelm 
the United States before the nation's vast productive strength could be converted 
from peace to war. The next war-and all of us pray it will be avoided-is likely 
to explode in a big smash. Cities may be all but obliterated." 
In your own state, Section 16 of Senate Bill 153 authorizes and directs each 
county and city of the Commonwealth to establish local civil defense in accordance 
with the State Civil Defense Plan and Program. Each county judge and chief 
executive of each city is authorized to appoint a director who shall have direct 
responsibility for the organization, administration and operation for local civil 
defense. As a result of this bill, the Governor has appointed a Director of Civil 
Defense ( General Lindsey), a deputy Director (Judge White) and a coordinator 
for mobile groups ( Col. Quinn ). The Director in turn has divided the state into 
five areas for mobile support, with an area director, who has on his staff assistants 
who are organizing the different services, such as medical, police, civil air patrol, 
rescue transportation, engineering, fire , comm unication, food and welfare, and 
supply. Considerable work has been done toward organizing the mobile support 
group here in Lexington and the cooperation from various organizations has been 
good. Of course, the organization is still a paper one, but as a columnist in the 
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Louisville Times pointed out, our big war with Communists is still in the paper 
stage, too. 
Before going too far with an organization and recruiting personnel, we should 
explain something of wh,~t we are organizing for. To qt~o.te from th~ Federal 
Civil Defense Manual: To meet the problems of orgamzmg for c1v1l defense 
operations it is essential ( 1) to have a clear picture ?~ the objectives, ( 2) k~ow 
what means are available, and ( 3) know how to mobilize them. Under ob1ectives 
would be ( 1) to minimize the effects upon the civilian population caused by an 
attack on the United States, ( 2) to deal with the immediate emergency condi-
tions which would be created by such an attack and ( 3) to effect emergency 
repairs or restore vital utilities and facilities destroyed by any such attack." 
In other words, we must first take care of the inm1ediate needs of our people, 
and then see that, in tum, the people are aided in going back to the pursuit of 
their occupations so that our fighting forces will be provided with equipment and 
supplies. If we are bombed it is all out war, and every able bodied man and 
woman will be in it some way or another. Fortunately, we have never had any 
practical experience in civil defense, but can use the experiences of others to 
make our plans. Civil defense was put to the test in Great Britain. In Gennany 
no doubt civil defense was able to help them prolong the fall of their armies. 'We 
do know that the atomic bomb is more destructive than any that were dropped 
on European cities, but with the number of bombs that were dropped on them 
we do know the results of ahnost complete destruction. From the experiences of 
others then we are trying to make our plans for civil defense. First in our plans 
will come organization and inventory of our resources, both in manpower and 
material. Then will come training to such an extent as is deemed necessary. 
In organizing for civil defense the basic principles are self heJp and mutual 
aid. It is expected that each city or urban area will have its organization and 
that the surrounding area will have pooled its resources so that mutual aid may 
be rendered. As mentioned, our state will have 5 •mobile support areas surround-
ing the cities of Louisville, Lexington, Paducah, Bowling Green and Ashland. 
Covington and Newport are in tl1e same area as Lexington. Each of these areas 
will have mobile support groups, comprised of tl1e various services. These groups 
will be so organized tlmt they can go to tl1e aid of any cities in their area and 
in addition could be moved to any city in tl1e state or to other states, if not 
needed at home. 
We will not go into the complete organization of a mobile unit, but will 
concentrate on engineering services as the Department of Highways, County and 
City Road Deparb11ents, and contrnctors will be concerned mostly with keeping 
streets and highways open. The principle of getting there "fustest" witl1 the 
"mostest" applies in Civil Defense as well as far, and we must depend on high-
ways. Remember that all Civil Defense services are dependent on our highways 
and streets. Fire trucks, ambulances, supply, rescue, doctors-just any aid we 
may mention will use our road and street system. 
Everybody knows tlmt our streets and highways do not now have the capacity 
to properly take care of peak traffic. You can imagine tl1e conditions if some 
of our highways were lost and tl1ere were curtai led rail deliveries and the added 
emergency traffic. Add to tlrnt panic conditions and we do have a problem. The 
first consideration is keeping every possible artery open and to have a plan where-
by we can enforce regulations that will insure necessary travel. As an example, 
we may think that cities are self-sufficient for some tin1e in the way of food, but 
~ 1 tis?:s show that it would only be a short time until necessary supplies for 
e hvmg would have to be moved in. If we have factories making critical war 
~:terial they must be kept ?pen and. products moved out. When Hamburg, 
f th
nnanr was bombed long distance trams were able to reach only the outskirts 
O e City. 
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The importance of highways is stressed as evidenced by the Federal Civil 
Defense Administration having schools in different sections of the country to which 
police and engineers are sent for instruction in traffic control. At this school it 
was emphasized that during ordinary times there is divided authority over high. 
way travel as far as state and city police are concerned, but that any driver 
can go anywhere and at any time he pleases as long as no laws are violated. 
In case of bombing, civil defense authorities would take over regulation of the 
highways and there must be much advance planning for this step. No one can 
predict just where bombs will strike, so all plans must be comprehensive enough 
to cover most eventualities and fluid enough to be changed as circumstances 
dictate. Naturally, the fi rst problem of traffic will be in the city itself. Our first 
concern would be to get fire-trucks, ambulances, food and medical supplies to 
the stricken part. That may mean clearing streets of rubbish and moving parked 
cars off the streets, and for longer travel could be repairing roads and bridges. 
But perhaps of equal or more importance keep other non-essential vehicles from 
driving on the streets. The local problem is of first importance, but at the same 
time, we have aid coming from other towns and cities and their help might be 
of as much importance as local aid. The highways must be kept open for them 
and unauthorized drivers kept off the essential roads. Remember that with un-
authorized cars we have two problems. They certainly would add to our traffic 
congestion, and if gas stations are closed to the public or under regulation we 
might have to deal with stalled cars. 
We probably need to think more seriously about civil defense in relation to 
highways than to any other service. vVe certainly would give up more readily 
otl1er tllings tlrnn our right to travel as we please; and restrictions on that travel 
will be drastic. The highways near any critical area must be regulated the same 
as railroad travel, with schedules, reservations, etc. Necessary travel may even 
have to be scheduled. Tot only must any traffic plan we have be carefully worked 
out but the public must be educated as to the reasons for it and how the plan 
will affect them. 
Let us first assume at tl1e state level that we have designated our highways 
as has New York with primary and secondary civil defense routes. Of course, 
we would not need as an elaborate plan as they have for we haven't so many 
large cities linked by a highway network. Some states, though, in addition to 
designating civil defense highways have civil defense markers on these routes. 
The State Highway would be responsible fo r the designating and marking of our 
routes and the State Police would carry out enforcement. Now, further assume 
that the Louisville area has a traffic plan which would include St. Matthews, 
Shively, Albany and Jeffersonville. In making their plans they do have the benefit 
of experience of European cities in estimating needs of a bombed area. They 
have designated streets which would be of importance in civil defense. They 
have a traffic plan which is fluid enough so that with some amendments it "~II 
work under any conditions except total destruction. They have block workers and 
auxiliary police and are prepared to enforce their plan of keeping every key street 
open. They have set up a highway traffic control center ( we hope it is outside 
tl1e bombed area ) . 
ow, a bomb strikes the city - the control center ( of which the highway 
traffic control center is a part ) immediately takes over, and through communica· 
lions, aerial observers or other reconnaissance determines where help is needed. 
All information is immediately plotted and corrections made in traffic plans. ow 
the fire trucks, ambulances, reserve, etc. can move in, and where necessary bull· 
dozers, graders, etc. move in to clear necessary streets. As soon as possible, an 
estimate is made of further needs for engineering equipment, ambulances, etc. 
and a call goes to state headquarters for mobile support groups. All of this time 
traffic control must know what hospitals are being used and keep routes open to 
52 
I ,.,.... 
them. Then come calls from state headquarters saying that so many trucks, am-
bulances and other equipment will arrive via U. S. 60 and where must they go. 
Control must tell traffic where they are needed and then traffic must give the 
route. It can be imagined in a major bombing that the dispatcher on a busy rail-
road would consider his work chHd's play as compared to scheduling traffic on 
streets. To add to his confusion, possibly the army will want to schedule a convoy 
through his area. 
Now, while Louisville is having its traffic problems someone is having traffic 
troubles outside of the Louisville area. Traffic is going west out of Lexington 
· and wants to go through Louisville and on to Indianapolis or Chicago. Maybe 
the traffic problem from Lexington to Frankfort isn't serious, but it is from Frank-
fort on. Traffic then must be by-passed by way of Madison, Indiana. It is recom-
mended in cases such as this that there be established a voluntary by-pass well 
out of the critical area and then a compulsory by-pass as we reach the critical 
traffic area. 
The same thing would apply to 31 W as to US 60. Possibly there would 
be established an alternate route near Elizabethtown. Now perhaps some of our 
key highways are damaged. That disrupts our plans. But there is only one 
answer. Send in repair crews, but in meantime use an alternate traffic plan. 
You can appreciate the fact that plans cannot be made when the emergency 
arises and that there must be much thought given to a plan ( of course, the plan 
may ·have to be changed, but it is easier to change a good plan than to make 
one up on the spur of the moment.) We must know what traffic ordinarily uses 
our roads and for what purposes, what the army plans, and any other information 
that wo~d help. Planning on personnel, signs, barricades is just one example of 
the planning. A good traffic control center would have a traffic planning division 
and under that an intelligence and plans section, a message center, operations 
division to supervise and regulate traffic, a personnel division and facilities division; 
also scheduling and dispatching branches. 
Our highways and streets in war, as in peace, are our li fe-line and sipce we 
can't build more in an emergency our job is to keep them open and used to the 
best advantage of the _country. · 
I might end this by asking you to see your nearest civil defense recruiting 
officer and sign up, but that appears unnecessary, as those of you in the highways 
have been drafted, and to judge from the recruiting Harry Wyse has done in the 
Lexington ·area among the contractors, they are in, too. I also understand that 
quite a few of the counties and cities are part" of this organization. 
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